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ABSTRACT  
   
The advent of advanced reproductive technologies has sparked a number 
of ethical concerns regarding the practices of reproductive tourism and 
commercial gestational surrogacy. In the past few decades, reproductive tourism 
has become a global industry in which individuals or couples travel, usually 
across borders, to gain access to reproductive services. This marketable field has 
expanded commercial gestational surrogacy—defined by a contractual 
relationship between an intending couple and gestational surrogate in which the 
surrogate has no genetic tie to fetus—to take on transnational complexities. India 
has experienced extreme growth due to a preferable combination of western 
educated doctors and extremely low medical costs. However, a slew of ethical 
issues have been brought to the forefront: the big ones manifesting as concern for 
reducing the worth of a woman to her reproductive capabilities as well as concern 
for the exploitation of third world women.  
This project will be based exclusively on literature review and serves 
primarily as a call for cultural competency and understanding the circumstances 
that gestational surrogates are faced with before implementing policy regulating 
commercial gestational surrogacy.  
The paper argues that issues of exploitation and commodification hinge on 
constructions of motherhood. It is critical to define and understand definitions of 
motherhood and how these definitions affect a woman's approach to reproduction 
within the cultural context of a gestational surrogate. This paper follows the case 
study of the Akanksha Infertility Clinic in northern India, a surrogacy clinic 
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housing around 50 Indian surrogates. The findings of the project invoke the 
critical significance of narratives of these Indian surrogates. From their narratives, 
I find that the surrogates construct the practice of surrogacy so that it fits into 
cultural comprehensions of Indian motherhood in which motherhood is selfless, 
significant, and shared. 
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Chapter 1 
BACKGROUND OF MEDICAL AND REPRODUCTIVE TOURISM 
THE EMERGENCE OF MEDICAL TOURISM 
Countries that heavily promote medical tourism usually do so for the 
following reasons: (1) increasing that country’s gross domestic product, (2) 
upgrading and advancing medical services, (3) establishing foreign relationships 
and generating a better trading relationship with other nations, and (4) boosting 
tourism.  Those advocating for growth of the medical tourism industry 
consistently stress the monetary gain that the industry can provide. There is an 
assumed trickle down effect. Proponents suggest that increases in revenue can be 
funneled back into the national health care system, thus increasing the overall 
health of citizens.  
 
Arguments for medical tourism. Proponents of medical tourism cite that 
the industry bridges the gap between patients unable to afford or gain access to 
treatment in one area of the world and medical facilities located in other regions. 
Marketing low airfare, low-cost telecommunications as well as communication 
through the internet promotes the concept of affordability. International medical 
travel is marked by its “shifting toward a more institutionalized and 
bureaucratized process. This means we might see a rapid increase in the number 
of patients traveling in search of health to countries such as India” (Turner, 2007, 
p. 322).  
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Arguments against medical tourism. On the other hand, many find that 
marketing medical tourism does not always address the harms of a globalized 
health care. Additionally, there is the fear that the establishment of for-profit 
hospitals will cater to more to foreign clientele and undermine local public health 
care.  The best health care clinicians have the potential to be drawn away from 
public hospitals by higher salaries and better facilities at for-profit hospitals. And 
medical tourism could lead to commodification of health services. Furthermore, 
“physicians at many leading medical tourism destination sites pay low premiums 
for medical malpractice insurance. As a result, medical tourists who are victims of 
negligence of medical malpractice might find themselves unable to obtain 
compensation for their suffering” (Turner, 2007, p. 322).  
 
REPRODUCTIVE TOURISM & GESTATIONAL SURROGACY 
Prior to the advent of reproductive technologies such as artificial 
insemination and in vitro fertilization, women who suffered from infertility were 
presented with only two alternatives—either accepting their infertility or going 
through the adoption process. However, the surge of advances in reproductive 
technologies have provided women the option of assisted reproduction and one of 
it’s derivatives—surrogacy.  
The advent of advanced reproductive technologies (ART) has generated a 
number of debates regarding the fertility process—from conception, to gestation, 
to the actual birthing process. “Reproductive tourism” denotes a practice in which 
individuals travel long distances, typically across borders, in order to receive 
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reproductive services that may not be available in their home country or may not 
be available at an affordable price (Voigt & Laing, 2010).  As such, the primary 
driver behind reproductive tourism is a desire to access either cheaper 
reproductive services or a wider range of them. Thus, citizens who would 
otherwise be subject to their home country’s restrictions have morphed their 
identity into that of a global consumer—one that is able to cherry pick services 
based on access, geographic convenience, and price (Martin, 2009).  
Commercial surrogacy is defined as a contractual relationship wherein a 
surrogate and/or surrogacy agency are paid compensation for a 9-month gestation 
period, including any sort of reasonable medical, legal and psychological 
expenses (Brinsden, 2003). Fundamentally, then, surrogate motherhood becomes 
an economic transaction. This brings up a number of ethical issues, first and 
foremost, the concern that commercial surrogacy violates or cheapens the 
traditional view of reproduction as an act of love, marriage, and/or sexual 
intercourse. Instead the identity of reproduction shifts to that of commodification 
of the body and of offspring; the act of commercial gestational surrogacy is often 
perceived as payment for reproductive services as well as for the relinquishing of 
parental rights to a child in return for monetary compensation (Pande, 2009).  
Thus, we ask whether commercial gestational surrogacy is ethical. What’s 
more, we ask if it is ethical to outsource this form of reproduction to women in 
developing countries. Additionally, layered on top of the ethics of reproduction as 
an economic transaction are issues of bodily autonomy, exploitation, and 
women’s rights. 
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Types of surrogacy arrangements. Surrogacy is defined as a procedure 
wherein an intending parent or couple contracts a woman, a surrogate, to conceive 
and carry a child, relinquishing parental rights upon the birth of that child. 
Surrogacy has brought about a number of types of arrangements—artificial 
insemination surrogacy, in vitro fertilization surrogacy, and finally, donor 
surrogacy.  
 
Traditional surrogacy—artificial insemination surrogacy. Traditional 
surrogacy involves an embryo generated by fertilization of a surrogate’s egg by 
the sperm of the intended father. The surrogate mother is artificially inseminated 
with the sperm of the intending father. She proceeds to carry the fetus to term. 
Upon the delivering of the child, the surrogate turns over parental rights of the 
child to the genetic father and his partner in return for payment for nine months of 
labor. The intended father or couple then adopts the child (Kerian, 1997).  
 
Gestational surrogacy—in vitro fertilization surrogacy. Gestational 
surrogacy involves an embryo that is created in a petri dish with the egg and 
sperm of the intending mother and father, respectively. After fertilization of the 
egg, the embryo is transferred to a gestational surrogate to carry to term. The child 
born from the surrogate, then, is biologically and genetically related to the 
intending parents but not at all to the gestational surrogate (Kerian, 1997).  
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Donor surrogacy. Donor surrogacy involves an embryo that is created 
from the egg or sperm of one of the intending parents and the sperm or egg of an 
anonymous donor. An embryo is then implanted in a surrogate mother to carry to 
term. Just like in vitro fertilization surrogacy, donor surrogacy requires the only 
role of the surrogate to be a gestator (Kerian, 1997).  
 
History of surrogacy. The concept of surrogacy is by no means a new 
one. One of the first mentions of the practice of surrogacy is in the Old 
Testament. The Old Testament tells the story of Sarah, Abraham’s wife. Sarah 
was unable to conceive and in a desperate attempt to carry on the family line, she 
persuaded Abraham to impregnate her maid, Hagar. Hagar conceived and gave 
birth to Ishmael whom Sarah and Abraham raised as their own son (Kerian, 
1997). Hindu mythology also gives a narrative of surrogacy in the Bhagvata 
Purana, Upon having been informed by the oracles that he would be killed by one 
of his nephews, the evil king of Mathura, Kansa, imprisoned his sister Devaki 
along with her husband, Vasudeva.  Every time she gave birth, Kansa smashed the 
child’s head to the floor, killing it. When Devaki conceived for the seventh time, 
she and Vasudeva prayed desperately to gods to intervene. The gods responded, 
summoning the goddess Yogamaya to transfer an embryo from the womb of 
Devaki to the womb of Yashoda—Vasudeva’s other wife who lived across the 
river. Yashoda gave birth to Krishna, and secretly raised the child, informing 
Kansa that Krishna was stillbirth and as such indicated no threat. Thus the genetic 
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child of Vasudeva and Devaki is incubated in and delivered from another womb 
(Smerdon, 2008). 
Even before surrogacy became publicized and caught in heated legal 
debates, informal surrogacy was widely practiced. Women would carry and 
deliver a child for an infertile couple altruistically—without any sort legal 
contract. These arrangements often existed between infertile couples and 
surrogates who were either friends or family members. It was often labeled as 
“altruistic surrogacy.” The mid 1970s brought about some of the earliest forms of 
contract surrogacy in California when an anonymous couple sent out an 
advertisement asking for a woman to conceive and carry a child through artificial 
insemination. Noel Keane wrote some of the first surrogacy contracts, 
circumventing adoption statutes to arrange for the legal system to pay surrogate 
mothers. Until this point, payment to a mother for relinquishment of parental 
rights had been prohibited. As such Noel Keane is termed “the father of surrogate 
motherhood” (Kerian, 2007, p. 118), setting the precedent for modern surrogacy 
arrangements. 
By the 1980s, contract surrogacy was a prominent practice in California. 
1986 saw the success of the first gestational surrogacy arrangement—surrogacy 
through in vitro fertilization in which the intended parents were the true genetic 
parents of the child, while the gestational surrogate held no genetic relationship 
with the child she carried (Kerian, 2007). 
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Historical cycles of public reactions to new reproductive technologies. 
Though the practice of surrogacy arrangements has been around since the biblical 
ages, there has been no established acceptable precedent for dealing with the 
relinquishment process. Trends are changing however. When literature about 
donor insemination first hit the journals in the 1940s, they stirred up mass mounts 
of controversy—generating high levels of resistance. The storm of debate 
eventually reached a calm, but the cycle of resistance and then acceptance hit 
again with the advent of in vitro fertilization in the 1970s and again with oocyte 
donation in the 1980s. Perhaps surrogacy will follow a similar cycle (den Akker, 
2007). 
Even more confusing than the definition of parenthood with the advent of 
advanced reproductive technologies is the classification methodology used to 
establish a parental identity. In its present stage—both on legal and cultural 
platforms—parenthood is defined by biological terms. This alludes to the 
importance of the genetic and biological tie in the legal and cultural 
comprehension of parenthood, at least in the Western world.  
The general public perception of gestational surrogacy seems to be 
cautious and worried—however, the great majority of surveys conducted are 
likely to be swayed by the negative cases evident in the media (den Akker, 2007). 
The latest trend, and complicating factor, in advanced reproductive 
technology is gestational surrogacy implemented on a transnational scale. This 
phenomenon has been rising in prominence in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century in which the middle class took to traveling to emerging countries for 
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reproductive technologies. This trend of reproductive tourism occurred in tandem 
with aggressive marketing campaigns that allowed American hospitals and 
biotechnology companies to use their connections in Asia to grow a reproductive 
tourism business into a powerful economic force (Gray & Poland, 2008). 
Unfortunately, this trend has been latent with ethical issues—arriving without 
international standards without much government oversight, or legal review. 
Thus, the rise in the practice of surrogacy has been flooded with legal, moral, and 
ethical issues involving contractual issues, commodification issues, and confusion 
in the assignment of parental rights.  
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Chapter 2 
ETHICS OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY 
ADVOCACY OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY 
Proponents of surrogacy believe that surrogacy should be protected as a 
procreative choice. It allows infertile individuals and couples the ability to have 
children, elevating their freedom, specifically their reproductive choices. They 
believe that fears of potential harms—commodification, exploitation—are 
outweighed by the potential benefit of surrogacy, the birth of a wanted child. 
Surrogate mothers give a “gift of life” to infertile couples in return for monetary 
compensation that they generally need creating a mutually beneficial relationship. 
Surrogacy then is not necessarily about commodification and exploitation of 
children and women. It can exist as a mature decision between rational human 
beings. As such, surrogacy advocates support surrogacy arrangements determined 
prior to conception with clearly expressed intentions of both the intending 
parent(s) and the surrogate (Kerian, 1997). 
 
Reproductive freedom transcending into female empowerment. Radical 
feminist writers argue that reproductive technologies have a “gendered nature” 
which centers on the misuses of woman’s bodies as mere means to meet 
patriarchal ends. As such many feminist scholars argue that advances in 
reproductive technologies do nothing more than further privilege the genetic 
desires of men and simply reduce the role of women to their procreative capacity 
(Pande, 2009).  
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However, there is a new movement that argues that surrogates have a 
different take on both the significance of the genetic ties to the embryo as well as 
the role of men in the surrogacy process. Surrogates view themselves as much 
more than a simple “receptacle” for male seed. The husband’s role has been taken 
over by medicine and technology—an injection in the case of surrogacy. A survey 
of women in a surrogacy clinic in Anand, India—a case that will be further 
expounded upon later in the paper—expresses attitudes that de-emphasized the 
role of the male in the reproductive process. In doing so Indian surrogates are 
simultaneously reinforcing and emphasizing the woman’s contribution as very 
active role in reproduction. In that same clinic, surrogates also tended to 
demonstrate a sense of entitlement to the financial compensation they were to 
receive from the commissioning parents. Some even expressed an unwillingness 
to discuss earning and spending of the money with their husbands. The questioned 
their role in the surrogacy process, asking, “what does he have to do in this? He 
did nothing. At least the other man gave his sperm” (Pande, 2009, p. 386).  
Women participating as gestational surrogates are able to use the act of 
reproduction as a means to remove herself from the traditional female role of 
caretaking and mothering by making the choice to gestate a child and gift it to a 
couple who is unable to reproduce themselves. As such, the Indian surrogate 
transcends the traditional reproductive duties by achieving validation in that she is 
employed and that she is able to help provide life for another. 
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COMMERCIAL GESTATIONAL SURROGACY AND ETHICAL 
CONCERNS 
When it comes to commercial gestational surrogacy, the primary issues 
appear to be that of commodification of the womb, true autonomy and subsequent 
exploitation, objectification of the surrogate, promotion and strengthening of 
societal inequalities, and proper informed consent. 
 
Commodification of the body; commodification of the womb. The 
concept of “renting out” one’s womb is unnerving and is often viewed as a form 
of prostitution, organ selling, or slavery, as each of these activities involve the 
payment for use of someone’s body or parts of someone’s body for another 
person’s benefit (Rimm, 2009). Thus there is divide as to whether only “altruistic” 
surrogacy, surrogacy that usually takes place within a family or between friends—
i.e. a woman carrying a child for her sister—is permissible while commercial 
surrogacy should be outlawed for reducing the reproductive process to financial 
terms.  
 
Autonomy and the potential for exploitation. One of the most 
concerning issues of transnational surrogacy—particularly when surrogates are 
outsourced from third world countries and tend to be women living in dire 
economic circumstances—is whether the surrogates are fully autonomous agents 
or whether or not they are coerced into the vocation. The majority of surrogates 
contracted in international surrogate agreements are economically impoverished. 
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It is of great concern that women are enticed into surrogacy with the prospect of 
earning an income worth what they would only make over a span of 10 to 15 
years in just a nine month gestation period (Rimm, 2009). These chunks of 
money, though almost always less than what a surrogate in Western, developed 
countries would be compensated with, represent large sums of money which are 
in and of them self, exploitative. As such, there is concern for whether 
economically impoverished women will agree to contract surrogacy arrangement 
without fully understanding the psychological and physical burdens they will be 
faced with (Palattiyil, 2010). Additionally, the contractual obligations set within 
international surrogate agreements are often demonstrative of the limited rights of 
the surrogate mother and her lack of input of the actual reproductive process.  
 
Objectification. Objectification in and of itself deals with the treating of a 
particular being as if it were nothing but an object. In the case of commercial 
surrogacy, surrogate mothers are treated as instruments—as tools for the 
commissioning genetic parents to obtain a child that is related to them (Berkhout, 
2008). Often, the genetic parents along with the surrogate mother view the 
surrogates as “incubators” or “maternal environments.”  
 
Promotion of inequality. The lack of national or international guidelines 
regarding commercial surrogacy has brought up a number of moral concerns–
specifically whether a nation has the ability to comprehend if reproductive 
tourism infringes on human rights and subsequent reproductive autonomy. The 
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prevalence of globalization and global consumers seems to undermine the power 
of the nation-state to sufficiently impinge on its ability to regulate just how 
reproductive technologies are being used and understood by its citizens (Rimm, 
2009). However, it is important to note that reproductive tourism is not an option 
that is easily acceptable to classes of people. In fact, it is almost exclusively 
available to the privileged upper class. As such, the “global citizen” is a member 
of a miniscule elite class and should in no way be understood to represent the 
accessibility of reproductive technologies—including gestational surrogacy—to 
the majority of the population.  
 
Issues of informed consent. A common view of informed consent is that 
it exists as a baseline condition implemented so that a health care institution and 
health care professional fulfill their ethical duties.  It is defined by three main 
components—voluntariness, information, as well as an individual’s capacity to 
consent (Freedman, 1975). Voluntariness is established when an individual can 
freely make a decision to undergo an intervention, free of any coercive outside 
factors. Providing adequate information is done on three different standards—
professional, objective, and subjective. The professional standard is defined as a 
physician disclosing information that would be relevant for other physicians. The 
objective standard is what a physician should disclose to any reasonable person 
including the nature and magnitude of potential risks as well as other available 
options. Finally a subjective standard is when a physician discloses what a patient 
would want to know.  The capacity to consent is the third aspect of having a full 
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informed consent.  It requires a patient to have full consciousness, understanding 
and reasoning.  
The superior educational and economic resources of the commissioning 
parents virtually guarantee that the negotiation situation will favor them. Unless 
the surrogate herself is proactive in advocating for her interests, no one in the 
negotiation has an incentive to ensure that the surrogates does not bear the full 
weight of the risks associated with these agreements (Scott, 2009). 
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Chapter 3 
GLOBALIZATION & ADVANCED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
GLOBALIZAING ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES. 
Assisted reproduction clinics are now found all over the world, including 
the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Latin America, and India. Global market forces 
play a huge role in the spread of ART as technologies are transferred through 
international clinical partnerships. As such, choices regarding the purchasing of 
ART equipment are determined by both the country in which a clinician practices 
as well as where he or she received training in ART. For the most part, fertility 
clinicians are trained in the United States or in Europe, subsequently driving up 
the demand for Western techniques and products. 
Assisted Reproductive Technology has also established international 
markets for the trade of reproductive body parts and services, expanding upon the 
already lucrative medical tourism industry.  Thus, “sperm, ova, embryos, and 
wombs are all desirable and profitable commodities, the trade of which serves the 
intersecting interests of many parties (donors, recipients, infertility specialists, and 
IVF brokers) and is facilitated by advances in global communications” (Ryan, 
2009, p. 813). When reproductive services are paired with active government 
support, as is the case in India, it becomes a market specifically targeting foreign 
clients, particularly those with the means and desire travel long distances for 
lower-cost reproductive services.  
Four countries express the range of regulations regarding reproductive 
technologies, loosely representing four modes of biopolitical regulations—
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conservative Germany, pronatalist Israel, liberal UK, and laissez-faire United 
States (Martin, 2009). Germany has some of the strictest regulations regarding the 
use of ART with the establishment of the Embryonic Protection Act, which 
allows for in vitro fertilization and artificial insemination but does not allow egg 
and embryo donation or any type of surrogacy arrangement. Israel takes a 
pronatalist stance. However egg donation is restricted except for women who 
have had infertility treatments in the past and have excess eggs to donate. Israel’s 
Embryo Agreement Carrying Law legalizes surrogacy arrangements under the 
approval of a public committee.  
The UK takes a liberal stance guided by the Human Fertilization and 
Embryonic Authority (HFEA). HFEA places age limits on egg donors as well as 
egg recipients, forbids sex selection and unreasonable payment to egg donors and 
permits prenatal screening and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. The UK is 
constantly updating their guidelines. The US has a laissez faire approach to 
advanced reproductive technologies (ART), lacking federal regulations. State-
based policies vary greatly and the assisted reproductive technology industry is 
guided primarily by market forces.  
 
The setting of a global standard for implementation of ART. 
Currently, there is an unbelievable amount of variation within and between 
nation-states. This does not necessarily mean that a universal policy is out of the 
question, but many scholars claim that a baseline universal “minimal regulation” 
will be more likely. Another source for aiding in the establishment of global 
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standards for the implementation of assisted reproductive technologies are 
intergovernmental as well as non-governmental organizations—the World Health 
Organization (WHO), the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), and the World Medical Association (WMA). Each of 
these organizations have released statements specifying bioethical standards, each 
individual statement provides minimal baseline of ethical practice. None focus on 
consistency between one another to achieve a “harmonization of regulation” 
(Martin, 2009, 263).  
 Additionally, the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-
Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption is another resource of the 
achieving a global standard when it comes to ART. It is an agreement involving 
the regulation and monitoring or transnational adoption among over seventy 
nations. The agreement sets baseline standards to ensure the enactment of full 
informed consent and the achievement of the best interests of the child. 
Additionally, the agreement mandates that all countries provide a central authority 
that enforces rules, keeps records of the adoption process, and establishes an open 
communication with the international national counterparts. 
Reproductive tourism demonstrates that, though there are national 
regulations in certain countries, citizens with the means to leave their homes in 
order to bypass restrictions will do so, whether for legal or monetary reasons. 
Thus in some sense, there is a diminished power of the nation-sate in that the 
“spirit of globalization and multilateralism facilitates reproductive tourism and 
may in fact undermine the power of the nation-state to regulate uses of 
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reproductive technologies of its citizenry” (Martin, 2009, p. 258).  Globalization 
makes it easier for a privileged upper class to cross borders to gain access to 
reproductive services. Local inequalities can be exaggerated on a global stage in 
the creation of a global citizen that can transcend their own nation-state. Again, it 
is important to note that this global citizen is a member of a very small elite group 
and is not at all representative of the majority.  
Reproductive tourism allows couples to pass borders and bypass cultural, 
ethical, and legal regulations of a particular nation-state. Martin (2009) cites 
globalization as an active transformative force in advanced reproductive 
technologies, both in that it offers opportunities and mobility for barren couples 
yet simultaneously maintains and even enhances existing societal inequalities. 
 
Liberal feminist framework—ART in the global south. This project 
focuses on the establishment of reproductive tourism and market niche in the 
global south. It is important, then, not only to understand the profitable benefits of 
this business, but also to understand why embedding the institution of ART in the 
global South may be problematic. When viewed through liberal feminist 
framework, focusing on women’s health in the global South, there are issues 
when dealing with notions of reproductive autonomy.  
 
Mohanty. Chandra Mohanty finds that,  
for poor women of color, the notion of a ‘woman’ right to choose’ to bear 
children has always been mediated by a coercive, racist state…for many 
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women of color, reproductive rights conceived in its broadest form, in 
terms of familial male/female relationships, but also more significantly, in 
terms of institutional relationships and state policies must be the basis for 
[correlations across race and class lines (Mohanty, 2003, p. 54). 
Thus, Mohanty pushes the general public to question exactly under what 
conditions can ARTs actually protect and promote women’s freedom.  She also 
asks that more attention be paid to the multiple power structures (for example 
caste, family, and governmental structures) that position women in society as well 
as for a better understanding of how women relate to one another. The 
transnational flow of reproductive products—gametes and embryos—re-
emphasizes pre-existing power imbalances, with globalization creating “new 
regimes of consumption” , driving the “reposition[ing] of women in new systems 
of inequality” (Gupta, 2006, p. 31).  
 
Qadeer. Qadeer focuses on the issues of the “indivisibility of reproductive 
autonomy from the ‘daily endeavors of women’s agency” (Correa, 2003, p. 21). 
She finds that feminists working in developing countries or economically 
impoverished regions fight against a generalized “single-issue” approach to 
reproductive policies and philosophies and calls for policies regarding ART to 
better understand the intersection of “poverty, gender, inequality, and 
cultural/religious norms underlying sexual and reproductive health challenges” 
(Ryan, 2009, p. 816).   
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We must understand why women seek out assisted reproductive 
technologies in order achieve a rich reproductive health system. A reproductive 
rights agenda will have to understand just how women participate in shaping 
economic and political fields on both a local and a global level. This project takes 
a stab and at understanding why Indian women from rural communities become 
surrogates—specifically focusing on the vehicle of understanding of 
“motherhood” in the Indian cultural context. 
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Chapter 4 
RESEARCH METHODS 
INITIAL RESEARCH QUESTION 
What role, if any, should the broad cultural development of female self-
empowerment, expressed as reproductive and economic freedom, play in future 
regulatory enactments regarding the practice of commercial gestational surrogacy 
in South India? 
However, as I researched the project, I found that in order to address these 
questions, I needed to understand something much more fundamental—the role of 
bioethics in an Indian framework.  By making claims about autonomy, 
commodification, and justice, I was already implementing a system of bioethics 
entrenched in Western philosophy on an Indian culture that functions much 
differently than the Western world. So, my new question became much more 
basic. 
 
EVOLVED RESEARCH QUESTION(S) 
How do conceptions of motherhood affect the meaning of bioethical 
principles—autonomy, beneficence, non-malfeasance, justice—when applied to 
the cultural context of an Indian gestational surrogate? 
I followed this up with the question: 
How should the aforementioned affects, if at all, play a role in the 
generation of policy and regulations regarding commercial gestational surrogacy? 
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METHODOLOGY 
Literature review.  
My literature review hits several main topics—I use the ASU databases as 
well as Google Scholar searching for Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 
Surrogacy, Transnational Surrogacy, Commercial Gestational Surrogacy, 
Surrogacy in India, Ethics of Gestational Surrogacy, Feminist Ethics, Third-
World Feminism, Reproductive Rights, Surrogacy as Reproductive Freedom, 
Indian Women and the Law, Narrative Ethics, and Meanings of Motherhood.   
 
PROPOSED ARGUMENTS 
I ask whether commercial gestational surrogacy is ethical. What’s more, I 
ask if it is ethical to outsource this form of reproduction to women in developing 
countries. Additionally, layered on top of the ethics of reproduction as an 
economic transaction are issues of bodily autonomy, exploitation, and women’s 
rights. 
Commercial gestational surrogacy fragments the role of motherhood—
separating the roles of genetic, gestational, and social motherhood. The bringing 
together of a surrogate with the commissioning mother can either create alliances 
and a form of shared experiences between women, or it can bring about certain 
hierarchies and inequalities—especially when the surrogates comes from lower 
socio-economic backgrounds than do commissioning parents. 
I argue that issues of exploitation and commodification seem to hinge on 
the concept of motherhood, or more specifically, on what defines motherhood. 
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Many western frameworks that outlaw or severely limit reproductive 
technologies, including commercial gestational surrogacy, appear to construct 
“legitimate” motherhood in a genetic sense. This is evidenced in the United States 
by the precedent setting court case—Johnson v. Calvert, in which the genetic 
mother was granted rights to a child over the surrogate mother. The judge found 
that relatedness as proved by a blood test was superior evidence of parenthood to 
the actual birthing of the child, thereby promoting genetic motherhood as more 
legitimate than gestational motherhood. Thus, if genetics is, in fact, what 
determines motherhood, the gestational surrogate’s worth is reduced to her 
reproductive capabilities and she becomes a “womb for rent.”  
However, in the case of transnational commercial gestational surrogacy, it 
important to define and understand the concept of motherhood within the cultural 
context that surrogacy exists. If they too find genetic ties to be the most important 
component in defining motherhood, then we can more accurately evaluate claims 
of exploitation and commodification. If not, which I believe to be the case, then 
we must more carefully consider their cultural construction of motherhood and 
how this affects the way in which they engage in and approach reproduction. This 
culturally competent comprehension of motherhood will allow us to fully evaluate 
whether commercial gestational surrogacy can be seen as a reproductive freedom 
or as a purely exploitative practice for surrogates in India.  
With the evolved research questions, I further argue that the application of 
Westernized bioethical principles have the potential to take on new meanings 
when applied in a different cultural context. Because gestational surrogacy does 
	    24 
fragment the role of motherhood, it is of vital importance to not only understand 
the religious, social, and legal frameworks of the Indian woman and Indian 
surrogate, but also to understand the meaning of and definition of Indian 
motherhood. In order to achieve this understanding, the use of narratives is 
employed. 
Narratives represent a worldview, a framework of knowledge, and a set of 
principles interacting with each other within the context of a story, scene or 
situation. It is also important for authoritative structures—fertility clinics, 
policymakers, governments—to properly derive information from narratives, 
making sense of the small details in order to find the significant values and 
traditions.  The use of narrative contributes to an understanding of moral 
discernment as well as arguments and principles that a patient holds dear. 
Narratives, then, serves as a means to establish a sense of truth and authenticity 
regarding the moral issues surrounding case studies in medicine.  
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Chapter 5 
INDIA’S MARKET FOR GESTATIONAL SURROGACY 
In the past few decades, India has experienced an extreme growth in 
commercial surrogacy cases. This is due primarily to two factors—(1) medical 
tourism practices in India are defined by a preferable combination of low medical 
costs and western-educated doctors—“first-world treatment for third-world 
prices” (Nussbaum 1998) as well as (2) individuals from the Western middle and 
upper classes originate from countries whose surrogacy legislation is either highly 
restrictive or banned altogether.  
Surrogacy in India, while legally permitted, has only recently been 
regulated. Even then, regulations are not always enforced. This makes India 
extremely attractive to commissioning parents unable to have a child of their own. 
They are, to a certain extent, guaranteed the successful birth of a child as well as 
the delivery of the child both physically and legally into the arms of the 
commissioning parents, conforming to Indian and American legal standards. 
India’s structure for commercial gestational surrogacy is unusual in that 
there are no federal regulations. It most closely resembles the rather liberal market 
structure apparent in California in which surrogacy contracts are managed almost 
exclusively by private agencies with little to no state involvement. India is 
currently the top destination for reproductive tourism, selling Western patients 
with their western-educated clinicians and low costs.  
 
 
	    26 
INDIA’S REGULATIONS 
In 2005, the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) established a set 
of national guidelines regarding reproductive tourism. However, they are not 
legally enforced—allowing foreigners to take advantage of India’s lack of 
regulation. Journalists are calling India’s lack of regulation “the ultimate 
outsourcing” (Rimm, 2009, p. 1429). 
Though there is no current legislation, India’s Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare has drafted a bill to regulate cases of commercial surrogacy in the 
subcontinent after India’s first major legal case involving commercial gestational 
surrogacy—the Baby Manji case. ICMR presented a national regulation 
addressing not only commercial surrogacy but also other reproductive 
technologies. India’s health minister Anbumani Ramadoss stated that,  
“In light of the recent controversy (involving a Japanese couple and an 
Indian surrogate mother), I think it’s time we had a law on surrogacy. It’s 
become more than sporadic and is lending itself to commercial 
exploitation like the kidney (transplant)” (Jayaram, 2008, p.1 ). 
Several prominent health care providers, including directors of infertility clinics, 
supported the legislation claiming that it would help deal with issues of an 
international black market and the potential for a bidding war for Indian 
surrogates. Ramadoss further stated, “the surrogacy laws will give confidence to 
those who come to India for fertility treatment that they are well within the laws 
of the country and at the same time protect the rights of the surrogate mother and 
baby (Points, 2008, p. 8). 
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The following Acts are the current legal parameters that India can apply to 
the regulation of gestational surrogacy.  
 
Indian Contract Act 1872 (the 1872 Act). The 1872 Act states that “all 
agreements are contracts if they are made with free consent, and for a lawful 
consideration and a lawful object” (Mangaldas, 2010, p. 1). A contract may be 
treated as unlawful if it involves injury to a person or a person’s property or if a 
court decides it to be immoral or against public policy.  
 
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956. The Hindu Adoption Act 
states that no payment can be presented nor received to create an incentive for the 
adoption of any individual. In relation to surrogacy, this 1956 Act equates 
surrogacy and adoption, finding that no payment should be given for the labor of 
a surrogate mother—even for the costs and expenses of pregnancy.  
 
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956 (the 1956 Act). The 1956 
Act prevents a contracting father from obtaining legal rights to a child, stating that  
“in the case of a Hindu minor, whether an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate 
unmarried girl, the mother – and after her the father – is the natural guardian” 
(Mangaldas, 2010, p. 1). Once it is proved, usually through blood tests, that a 
child has no genetic relationship to the surrogate’s husband, the child is treated as 
illegitimate. 
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The Assisted Reproductive Technology Bill of 2008. India’s National 
Guidelines and Proposed ICRM Guidelines along with the recently passed ART 
(Assisted Reproductive Technology) Bill are the first pieces of legislation 
responding to the jump in India’s surrogacy practice. It requires a prospective 
surrogate to be under the age of 45 and to have children of her own—a mandate 
implemented to lessen the chance of her feeling connected to the child she is 
contracted to give away.  
The Assisted Reproductive Technologies Bill of 2008 permits gestational 
surrogacy though it is restricted to when it is medical impossible or medically 
undesirable for the genetic mother to carry a baby to term. Not only must Indian 
women be under 45 to act as a surrogate, they are only allotted 5 successful live 
births, including their own children (Hochschild, 2009). 
The Bill defends commercial surrogacy as a permissible 
business/marketplace in India, but also suggests the need for an application of 
labor rights framework to help reconcile the competing values of contractual 
autonomy and protection from exploitation. It makes recommendations for 
modifying proposed regulations—these include “recognizing minimum standards 
of care and compensation for surrogates, limiting contractual obligations 
enforceable against the surrogate, and requiring that neutral intermediaries 
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SURROGACY LEGISLATION IN INDIA 
Concerns regarding surrogacy arrangements from legal and ethical stances 
involve three types of contract participants—the commissioning/intending 
parents, the surrogate, and the child born of the surrogate.  The following court 
cases were legislated in India and demonstrate the relationships between the three 
aforementioned parties involved in surrogacy contracts as well as the need for 
regulation of surrogacy on national and international levels.  
 
Baby Manji. In 2007, a couple from Japan, Ikufumi and Yuki Yamada, 
made their way to the Akanksha Infertility Clinic in northern India to discuss a 
potential gestational surrogacy with the clinic’s head doctor, Dr. Nayna Patel. Dr. 
Patel arranged a meeting with a married Indian mother, Pritiben Mehta, and 
generated a surrogacy contract between Mehta and the Yamadas.  Patel created an 
embryo using Ikufumi Yamada’s sperm and egg from an anonymous Indian 
donor. The embryo was implanted in Mehta who carried the baby to term 
(Points). By mid June of the following year, the Yamada’s had divorced. In July, 
their baby, Baby Manji, was born. Ikufumi Yamada desperately wanted to keep 
and raise the child, but Yuki Yamada wanted nothing to do with the situation. 
Baby Manji was left then with three mothers—a surrogate who was forced to 
relinquish him due to contractual terms, a donor mother whose anonymity 
prevented any sort of relationship, and an intended mother who changed her mind.  
 Dr. Patel’s surrogacy contract had no guidelines for a situation like this. 
India’s lack of laws and regulations regarding the practice didn’t help either.  
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Baby Manji was stuck in a legislative limbo for over a year—courts unable to 
determine the parentage or nationality of the child, both in Indian and Japanese 
law.  Baby Manji was eventually given back to Ikufumi Yamada, though it was a 
complicated process. Parental rights were granted to the child’s grandmother, for 
a brief period of time making Ikufumi Yamda his daughter’s legally adoptive 
brother. However, once in Japan, Ikufumi Yamada legally adopted baby Manji 
into his own custody (Points, 2008).  
 
Balaz v. India. Jan Balaz v. Union of India was a court cased based in North 
India in the Gujarat High Court. The Balaz case surrounds the issue of the 
citizenship of twins born through commercial gestational surrogacy by a German 
couple—Jan Balaz and Susanne Lohle. The actual surrogacy process went well—
the twins were successfully delivered and the surrogate mother gave up parental 
rights. However, because German does not recognize the practice of surrogacy, 
the twins were not able to get German citizenship if they are not first recognized 
as Indian citizens. This brought up questions in the Indian legal system as to 
whether a child born to a surrogate mother in India whose biological parents are 
foreign would be able to achieve Indian citizenship. For two years, the twins 
remained stateless. 
In 2009, the Supreme Court of India found a solution. It held that children 
born to a gestational surrogate are citizens of India and therefore are able to get an 
Indian passport. However, this did confer parental rights the surrogate mother, 
and the twins had to be adopted by Balaz couple.  
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THE DEBATE CONTINUES 
Thus, both cases demonstrate the need for stricter regulations of 
commercial surrogacy from both a national and international perspective. The 
Baby Manji case solidified India’s need to develop a comprehensive national 
policy regarding commercial gestational surrogacy. The fact that the struggle to 
determine Manji’s nationality and parents remained in question for over a year 
after the child’s birth is unacceptable. The growth of advanced reproductive 
technologies in India is surging far beyond what India’s current legal system can 
handle. As the case of Baby Manji demonstrates, the lack of regulations has raised 
issues for international relations as well as for private surrogacy clinics. India’s 
public, led by a dynamic NGO sector, is currently debating whether or not 
commercial surrogacy should be legal at all in the subcontinent. The Balaz case 
demonstrates the confusion transnational gestational surrogacy brings about when 
it comes to defining the citizenship of a child.  It additionally brings to light the 
lack of communication between countries with different perspectives on 
gestational surrogacy.  
Both cases also bring up questions,  
What is a mother? What is a father? What does it mean to be a human? A 
citizen? How do we recognize and validate the identities of people and 
families formed through emerging technologies? And if, in doing so, we 
change our core definitions of family, have we made progress? (Points, 
2008, p. 8).  
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Internationally, stakeholders in transnational commercial gestational surrogacy 
have begun to state their views on the ethical issues brought about by fertility 
tourism.  2008 saw the first national decision in India regarding commercial 
surrogacy and fertility tourism. Since then, advocates and legal scholars have 
started to study the Baby Manji and Balaz cases more in depth and give a more 
detailed analysis to the number of ethical issues surrounding them. 
Globally, the International Federation of Social Workers issued a 
statement in which they voiced severe concern regarding the ethical and social 
dynamic of transnational commercial gestational surrogacy.  The European 
Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology has also weighed in, calling for 
a “reduction in cross-border reproductive care referrals and more aggressive 
measures to ensure safety and quality when patients do seek treatment abroad” 
(Points, 2008, p. 8). The fertility tourism industry itself has started to propose 
regulations, presumably as a way to soothe and reassure their consumer base. The 
industry has set up online forums that engage potential customers in policy 
debates regarding transnational surrogacy.  
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Chapter 6 
FINDINGS 
I asked how definitions of motherhood affect how Western bioethical 
principles are applied to the cultural context of an Indian gestational surrogate and 
then how this should be interpreted when generating policy regulating commercial 
gestational surrogacy. In order to understand these questions, I find the need to 
understand the types of motherhood gestational surrogacy creates, how bioethical 
principles are understood in the Western context as well as understand what 
“Indian motherhood” is defined as. Once I define these, I use one case study—the 
Akanksha Infertility Clinic—to determine just how bioethical principles are 
affected in the cultural context of the Indian surrogate.  
 
BIOETHICAL PRINCIPLES 
In health care, it is difficult to invoke universal principles. There are just 
too many unaccounted for variables that have the ability influence the context of 
clinical cases. Additionally, medical principles and rules can be applied in many 
situations and be implemented differently. However, Western biomedicine 
subscribes to four main principles—though their limitations are acknowledged. 
These principles are autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice.  
 
Autonomy. The bioethical principle of autonomy stresses the importance 
of an individual’s freedom and choice. Autonomy stresses “freedom from external 
constraint and presence of critical mental capacities such as understanding, 
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intending and voluntary decision making capacity” (Beauchamp, 2007, p. 4). 
Autonomy is also linked to the belief that each individual has intrinsic value, 
separate from outside circumstances that normally confer value. That is, 
autonomous individuals are those that are ends in themselves and thus should be 
treated as a means to an end.  
 
Beneficence. The principle of beneficence is abstaining from doing harm 
to others, often by helping “others further their important and legitimate interests, 
largely by preventing or removing possible harms” (Beauchamp, 2007, p. 5).  
More simply put, it is the principle of maximizing the benefit to a patient while 
minimizing harms. William Frakena defines this principle as, “One ought not to 
inflict evil or harm, One ought to prevent evil and harm, One ought to remove evil 
and harm, One ought to do or promote good” (Beauchamp, 2007, p. 5). 
 
Non-maleficence. Non-maleficence is the obligation to not harm others. 
This obligation is distinct from the principle of beneficence in that it usually more 
stringent—not harming a patient is more crucial than doing good. The duty to not 
harm is more of an expectation, particularly in the medical field. Applications of 
the duty to do no harm is “supported by rigorous risk-benefit analyses” 
(Beauchamp, 2007, p. 4). Breaking this obligation is defined as “negligence.”  
 
Justice. Justice is achieved if an individual is treated fairly according to 
what they are owed. Beauchamp discusses distributive justice as well as a formal 
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principle of justice. The latter is defined by the idea that like cases should be 
treated similarly. Justice, then, is often looked at through the concept of 
entitlement as well as of distributive justice. It is a common holding that equal 
people should have access to equal treatment (Beauchamp, 2007).  
 
CONCEPTIONS OF MOTHERHOOD 
In many cultures, women are closely tied to the role of motherhood—so 
much so that it is viewed as intrinsic to the female identity. Often times, 
especially in Indian culture, females are not perceived as “real” or “true” women 
unless they have proven their reproductive capabilities—by producing a child.  
Feminists have argued fervently against this definition of womanhood and have 
pushed for a greater “attention on the continued ways women are more socially 
disadvantaged than men by analyzing the sexual oppressions women suffer, and 
by proposing interpersonal as well as political and legal solutions” (Lorber, 2001, 
p. 4). 
Understandings and definitions of motherhood, however, are quite 
fragmented in the feminist community.   Some feminist groups even object to the 
use of the term, “surrogate” claiming that it does not correctly or fully explain the 
process of contract surrogacy since the woman carrying the baby to term is a 
legitimate mother and should be though of as such. Conversely, others believe 
that social motherhood is the only type of motherhood that should be viewed as 
legitimate. They find that parenthood is not defined by biological ties—citing 
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adoption as an example—and that parenthood is established by individuals 
meeting social expectations regarding parental responsibilities.  
The individuals in the first group are known as liberal feminists. They find 
that the division of motherhood brought about by advanced reproductive 
technologies—the genetic mother, the gestational mother, and the social mother—
has the ability to establish reproductive freedom for women. These technological 
advances are able to liberate women from the expectations of their reproductive 
biology as well as the societal expectations of women to be both child bearers and 
caretakers. In this view, social motherhood becomes a defining feature in 
motherhood rather than the biological and genetic relationship. Liberal feminists 
find that “motherhood rooted in biology is a cultural myth that overlooks the 
intense social conditioning that women receive throughout their childhoods and 
adult lives to desire children” (Hammons, 2008, p. 272).  Hammons also finds 
that this fragmentation of motherhood gives women an active role and a choice in 
the reproductive process—empowering them. As such, the technologies have the 
ability to 
bring women closer together rather than further apart. Already there are 
reports of contracted mothers living in close proximity to the couples who 
commissioned them and sharing the joy of the new life. Such reports 
bolster the claim that contracted motherhood can be viewed not as the 
male-directed and male manipulated specialization and segmentation of 
the female reproductive system, but as two women getting together…to 
achieve, in unison, something neither could do alone (Tong, 1989, p. 92).  
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Other feminist positions hold that the genetic definition of motherhood should be 
given primacy to or at the very minimum and equal grade to social motherhood. 
This perspective finds that advanced reproductive technologies commodify 
women as well as reduce the role of gestation to a mode of production. This 
perspective also raises the issue of exploitation of poor women for their wombs 
and/or eggs to produce children that will be raised by a wealthier women. Rich 
(1986) noted that 
female biology and the diffuse intense sexual radiation out from the 
clitoris, breasts, uterus, vagina; the lunar cycle of menstruation; the 
gestation and fruition of life, which can take place in the body—had far 
more radical implications that we have yet come to appreciate…(Rich, 
1986, p. 32-33). 
The follow ases involving ARTs reflect these differing understandings of 
motherhood: 
 
Baby M. In 1987, the concept of traditional surrogate motherhood 
grabbed the public’s attention with an onslaught of legal and media attention—the 
great majority of it, negative. The landmark case was between the Sterns, a well 
off couple from New Jersey, and their surrogate, Mary Beth Whitehead. Because 
it was a traditional surrogacy, Mary Beth Whitehead contributed her own egg to 
the pregnancy, fertilized by Mr. Stern’s sperm. After giving birth, contrary to 
what Whitehead had agreed to with the Sterns, she decided she wanted to keep the 
child. After months of the debate regarding what constituted appropriate 
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motherhood, the New Jersey Superior Court held the surrogacy contract and gave 
rights of Baby M to the Sterns.  
 The case was at the center of media attention for a year; it had brought to 
the forefront a “worst-case scenario” in a surrogacy contract—a surrogate who 
attempts to break that contract, a custody battle, and moral ambiguity of rights of 
parenthood. Baby M became a critical moment for the United States legislative 
system—serving as a discourse on the problems of unregulated commercial 
surrogacy. Following the case, “twenty-six state legislatures introduced seventy-
two bills on the issues of surrogacy. Hundreds more bills were introduced in the 
following years, split fifty-fifty on whether to permit or prohibit all forms of 
surrogacy” (Markens 2007, p. 22).  
Surrogacy arrangements also began to move from mere contractual 
agreements between to parties to being regulated by an objective third party—that 
is, began to involve lawyer and a subsequent contract. The late 1980s saw an 
informal set of industry guidelines for commercial surrogacy developing (Ragone, 
1994) in response to the negative Baby M coverage. These included strategies that 
protected the surrogacy industry from receiving more negative attention by 
avoiding views of surrogacy that depicted the practice as exploitative or immoral 
(Ragone 1994). However, these industry guidelines were accepted and 
implemented informally by surrogacy clinics.  
They were helpful, though, as gestational surrogacy increased from 
making up less that 5 percent of surrogate births to over 50 percent by 1994 
(Ragone & Twine 2000). Ragone’s belief is that while these legal factors and 
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industry guidelines brought about by the Baby M case have contribute to the jump 
in gestational surrogacies, what is also at work is “people’s adherence to 
‘traditional’ American kinship ideology and ideas of biological relatedness” 
(Ragone & Twine, 2000, p. 57).  
 
Johnson v. Calvert. The Johnson v. Calvert case is the first case in the 
United States where a ruling was made regarding parenthood in a gestational 
surrogacy case. The case was brought about by Mark and Crispina Calvert. 
Crispina had undergone a hysterectomy, and, though her ovaries were still 
capable of producing eggs, she could not carry a child. So, she and her husband 
turned to gestational surrogacy, entering into a contractual agreement with 
surrogate, Anna Johnson. Both parties signed a contract where the Calverts agreed 
both to pay Anna $10,000 for her services as well as buy her life insurance in 
return for Anna relinquishing parental rights after the birth. 
The in vitro fertilization of Crispina and Mark’s embryo was successfully 
completed, but while still pregnant, Anna demanded payment immediately. She 
threatened that if not paid, she would not relinquish the child after birth. The 
Calverts filed a lawsuit searching for a judicial confirmation that, based on the 
contract Anna signed, she could have no parental rights to the baby. The courts 
eventually ruled in favor of the Calverts, deeming them the child’s “natural” 
parents. This was further affirmed when the trial was taken to the California 
Supreme Court. California Family Code section 7610 finds that a woman can 
establish proof of maternity in three ways: proof of having given birth to the 
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child, proof of a genetic relationship with the child; or proof of adoption” 
(Walton, 1996, p. 1). By signing the gestational surrogacy contract, Anna Johnson 
conceded that the Calverts were the genetic parents, and as such qualified in a 
legal sense to parental rights by virtue of a genetic relationship. However, 
Johnson qualified as well by her role as the birthmother. Thus, both women had 
legitimate maternity claims under California law. The California Supreme Court 
decided to “break the tie” simultaneously indicating that there cannot be two 
women with natural maternal rights.  The Supreme Court ruled that Crispina was 
the natural mother.  
The Calvert v. Johnson case ruled that the individuals who enter a 
surrogacy contract with the intent to care for the baby resulting from the 
surrogacy process are the child’s legal parents. Thus, “since the intent to care for a 
child at the time of the contract will always lie with the prospective parents, the 
Johnson holding created a decision-making process that ignores other pertinent 
factors” (Walton, 1996, p. 1). 
 
The result of the Johnson holding. The other “pertinent factors” ignored 
by the Johnson case included consideration of the situational and social 
circumstances within which the surrogacy contract exists, the contribution of the 
surrogate, as well as the potential bonding between a surrogate mother and the 
fetus. According the California Supreme Court’s decision, cases similar to Calvert 
v. Johnson would not be able to consider changes that occur over the course of a 
pregnancy, for example, a divorce. In this case, perhaps the surrogate could give 
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better home and upbringing for the child. Also ignored is the genetic contribution. 
The California Fourth District appellate court stated that under Calvert v. 
Johnson, “biology is destiny,” perhaps more accurately reflecting the idea that 
“genetic origin is destiny” (Walton, 1996, p. 1). Thus, though the surrogate 
mother is genetically unrelated to the fetus, she does nourish the fetus with 
hormones, antibodies, proteins…etc.  
Johnson v. Calvert is one of the first and only cases involving a 
commercial gestational surrogacy as well as in which a legislative ruling gave 
clear preference to a certain type of motherhood. The California Supreme Court 
ruled that the intending and genetic parents, the Calverts, were the legal parents 
and not the gestational surrogate, Anna Johnson. Specifically the court claimed 
that  
since Crispina [Calvert] is the child’s mother under California law because 
she, not Anna [Johnson], provided the ovum for the in-vitro fertilization 
procedure, intending to raise the child as her own, it follows that any 
constitutional interests Anna possesses in the situation are something less 
than those of a mother (Johnson v. Calvert, 1993, p. 19). 
  
Moschetta v. Moschetta. All cases revolving around traditional 
surrogacy—that in which the surrogate donates her eggs—have held that 
surrogates, and not the intending mothers, were the legitimate mothers. Moschetta 
v. Moschetta (1994) occurred when a surrogate was artificially inseminated with 
the sperm of an intended father.  Upon giving birth, the surrogate, who was the 
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birth as well as biological mother, fought for custody of the child. The courts 
however, did not recognize her legitimacy as a mother, respecting the surrogacy 
contract and each party’s intent at the time the contract was signed (Hammons, 
2008). 
The court also stated that for individuals or couples who cannot afford in 
vitro fertilization or who turn to traditional surrogacy practices (artificial 
insemination) because a woman does not have enough eggs or eggs suitable for 
IVF are not assured that their intentions will be respected and honored in a court 
of law. As such, the genetic tie is stressed, this time in a different manner, as the 
surrogate holds rights to the child born of a surrogacy agreement and not the 
intended mother. 
 
McDonald v. McDonald. In McDonald v. McDonald, a surrogate birthed 
twins created from a donated egg and her own husband’s sperm. The Court drew 
from the Johnson v. Calvert case to determine that the legitimate mother in the 
case was the intending mother and not the genetic mother.   (The intending mother 
is the mother who commissions the surrogacy—separate from the genetic mother 
in this particular case as a donor egg was used.) 
This demonstrated a preference gestational ties as a defining feature of 
motherhood over genetic bonds despite the fact that that all parities in the case 
recognized and emphasized the importance of genetic bonds (Hammons, 2008).  
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It is quite evident then, that based on the mixed findings of the courts, 
specifically in the United States, there are various and often times confliction 
understandings of motherhood within American case law. Some find that 
surrogacy is just a variation of artificial insemination and should be treated no 
differently while others firmly believe that gestational surrogacy establishes a 
strong and lasting connection between a surrogate and the child she is carrying. 
Similarly, gestation has also been argued to be a definitive act of motherhood, 
more so than providing eggs. While egg donations do require a great degree of 
invasive process, a surrogate donates her body for nine-months. She is more than 
an incubator—the experience is both miraculous and meaningful. Thus, many 
chalk up egg donations to being on par with sperm donation and find the 
gestational mother to be the legitimate mother of a child born of surrogacy.  
  So then, the courts have made no authoritative decision on the definition 
of motherhood.  Whether it is seen as a social bond or a biological reality seems 
to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Social motherhood seems to be 
downplayed in cases involving artificial insemination when the biological mother 
is involved on both a gestational and genetic level. Moschetta v. Moschetta stated 
that, 
In traditional surrogacy the so-called ‘surrogate’ mother is not the only 
woman who gave birth to the child, but the child’s genetic mother as well. 
Thus when both gestational and genetic motherhood are present in the 
surrogate, the intended mother has consistently lost her claim to be the 
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child’s legal mother even though it may have been her desire to have a 
child that initiated the surrogacy process (Hammons, 2008, p. 277). 
Reproductive technologies make the definition of motherhood even more 
confusing as they establish and make possible a number of new relationships 
between mother and child. Society still has to catch up—to develop a new 
framework for recognition of these new processes and the new relations they 
create. Old conceptions regarding the notion of family fail to address the 
situations advanced reproductive technologies create. As such the general public 
is put in the position of either rethinking our current definitions of the maternal 
and of motherhood, or to force new technologies old “ill-fitting” social 
frameworks.  
To reiterate, the American judicial system seems to hold that there are 
certain aspects of biological and genetic motherhood that are definitive measures 
of motherhood while finding social motherhood “transient.” More research is 
needed in order to understand whether and how judicial rule will affect the use of 
advance reproductive technologies. Cases such as Johnson v. Calvert, Moschetta 
v. Moschetta, and McDonald v. McDonald help bring to the forefront the 
processes and factors that are changing our current understanding of motherhood 
and family.  
 
Baby Manji. Baby Manji’s case is often viewed as the “Baby M” of India 
in that both cases led to an awakening to the need of stricter and more enforced 
regulations in the realm of commercial surrogacy. Both cases, Baby M in 1987 
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and Baby Manji in 2008 gave visibility to the “worst fears” of surrogacy cases—
to a sharp change in the way we define kinship, parenthood, and family. It is, 
however, important to recognize the differences between these cases. Baby M 
emphasized that the nurturing characteristic of motherhood was not a strong 
enough trait to hide the inconsistencies in an American tradition that places heavy 
value on the concept of the blood tie. Traditional surrogacy was inconsistent was 
this, and the controversy brought about by Baby M exacerbated this discomfort.  
Baby Manji’s case, however, brought about a new set of cultural and legal 
concerns regarding surrogacy—even more so in that it was done on a 
transnational scale. One of the stark differences was that India law does not allow 
single father to adopt. It is extremely inconsistent with the opportunities advanced 
reproductive technologies bring about, which allow for single man to have his 
own child. India’s legal system finds that parenthood is not legally permissible 
without a mother involved. But as has been evidenced by numerous court rulings, 
even surrogacy is fractured on who the mother is and how she is defined. 
 
INDIAN MOTHERHOOD 
Cultural understandings of motherhood and the experiences of mothering 
and motherly love are derived from definitions of motherhood within the context 
of the Indian kinship system (Lynch, 1990). Lynch, (1990) also claims that the 
biological and genetic tie between an Indian mother and her child has always been 
de-emphasized. This ensures that a mother will never become too possessive of 
her child. Thus an Indian mother is 
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expected to deindividualize her relationship with her child to the extent 
that any member of the  family can  be entrusted with its care. Thus, every 
day behavior in Indian families self-consciously recognizes the fact that 
the process of mothering, unlike the process of childbearing, can involve a 
number of surrogates in addition to, or instead of, the real mother (Lynch, 
1990, p. 167).  
Indian motherhood then, is an odd sort of contradiction. The majority of Indian 
families are patriarchal in nature. Despite this, the role of mothers and 
motherhood is glorified and praised for the contribution it makes to the overall 
health and happiness of the Indian family unit.   The image of an Indian mother 
makes a significant impact on the Indian social system. Yet her role as a mother is 
not selfish—the Indian family unit ensures that certain aspects of mothering 
should be shared among all family members, especially intimacy, the relationship 
with the child.  
Surrogates then, are both fulfilling this ideal or glorified role of mother as 
well as treating motherhood as their culture has trained them to—as a shared 
practice.  
 
Case study: the Akanksha Infertility Clinic. The Akanksha Infertility 
clinic is located in Anand, a sleepy dairy down in the western state of Gujurat. 
Though Anand’s population is small, just 150,000, it is now at forefront of India’s 
booming reproductive tourism business. The clinic is directed by Dr. Nayna Patel. 
She put Anand on the map when she constructed a gestational surrogacy 
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arrangement for her own biological daughter. Patel’s daughter had been having 
trouble conceiving for years and Patel took it upon herself to implant an embryo 
generated by her daughter’s egg and son-in-law’s sperm into the womb of a local 
Anand woman. The surrogate gave birth to twins—Patel’s own genetic 
grandchildren. Once news of Patel’s success spread, she was swarmed with 
requests to orchestrate more surrogacy arrangements. The clinic now houses just 
over 50 surrogates, with more than 150 couples on the waiting list—requests 
ranging from Taiwan, to the United States, to Japan, and to much of Europe. 
Between 25 and 30 surrogates are pregnant at any given time and are paid 
between 5 and 7 thousands—an estimated 10 years worth of salary for a rural 
Indian. All surrogates are required to relinquish maternal rights upon birth and 
hand the baby over.  
This thesis focuses on the concept of motherhood based exclusively on 
pre-existing literature regarding surrogate relations in the Akanksha Infertility 
Clinic.  
 
Stigma and Indian surrogacy—surrogacy as dirty work. Pande (2010) 
defines commercial gestational surrogacy as engaging in a labor practice that is 
particularly stigmatized. As such, surrogates develop unique emotional and 
ideological frameworks to cope with the stigmas they face. The father of the 
academic approach to studying stigma, Erving Goffman, argues that “bodily signs 
that depart from the ordinary can be deeply discrediting” (Pande, 2010, p. 293). 
Surrogates are also involved in “dirty work,” a term used to describe certain 
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occupations that are viewed by society as degrading or disgusting. The “dirty” 
aspect of these jobs, then, refer both to concepts of the amount of filth involved in 
the labor (for example, janitors, street sweepers, butchers) and or as well as a 
perceived lack of moral conceptions (for example, sex work).  Certain types of 
dirty work fall into a category where the work is both applauded as selfless and 
brave though still perceived as deviant from the way in which society operates. 
Surrogacy falls in this category with surrogates often describes as “angels” giving 
the “gift of life,” while simultaneously shrouded in ethical concerns of the renting 
out of wombs or the commodification of motherhood. Indian surrogates seem to 
face a higher degree of stigma than those in other countries. As a result, the 
majority of surrogates work in secrecy—leaving their communities and families 
during the pregnancy to take refuge in the fertility clinic or in hostels specifically 
for surrogates. If they choose to reside in their homes, they will tell neighbors that 
the baby is hers and will claim miscarriage after giving the child to the intended 
parents.  
 
Coping with stigma—the narrative of the Indian surrogate. Surrogates 
at the Akanksha fertility clinic exist in a world where the people around them—
the media, their communities, medical professionals, other surrogates—construct 
a number of meanings to the surrogacy process. A surrogate’s family will often 
justify a surrogacy as a familial duty so that the woman may contribute to the 
household finances. The media and surrounding community often see it as “dirty 
work,” the selling of one’s body and reproductive capability. The medical field 
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has an impersonal approach to surrogacy, often times reducing the role of the 
surrogate to simply that of a vessel. Pande finds that in order to respond the 
multitude of approaches to commercial surrogacy, surrogates invoke the use of 
four narrative strategies:  
First, they created symbolic boundaries between surrogacy and sex work 
and between surrogacy and giving a child away for adoption. Second, they 
downplayed the element of choice in their decision to become surrogates. 
Third, they resisted their disposability in the "labor" process. Finally, the 
women simultaneously distanced themselves from and make claims on the 
baby (Pande, 2010, p. 307).  
 
More than just “baby-sellers.” The identity of India’s rural working class 
is defined by “boundary work” in which individuals construct ideas of self-worth 
by understanding and interpreting the distinction between them and those who 
belong to other classes (Pande, 2010, p. 300) . This interpretation allows the 
working class to affirm the their dignity by developing high moral standards 
regarding their work ethics.  
When boundary work is applied to “dirty work,” participants in particular 
“dirty work” field make comparisons with other social groups that they find to be 
in a similar position, but more disadvantaged in one way or another. Ashfort & 
Kreiner (1999) claim, “these groups are sufficiently similar to justify the 
comparison, but are ‘inferior’ enough to gratify the need for self-esteem” (p. 423). 
The surrogates in Pande’s study seem to use commercial sex work as their 
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comparative occupational field. Thus, one way the surrogates in the Akanksha 
Infertility Clinic deal with stigma is by comparing themselves to sex workers—
noting the similarities in the commercialization of body parts, but noting the sex 
workers inferior position in that they don’t get to provide a life for another.  
 
Choice vs. necessity. The concept of “Majboori” or “necessity” becomes 
an important narrative for the Indian surrogate. Though many proponents of 
Indian surrogate actually place emphasis on the occurrence of third world women 
gaining agency by making their own reproductive choices, the majority of 
surrogates in the Akanksha infertility clinic though, feel differently. Regarding 
their decision to become surrogates, they often suggested that it was in fact not 
their decision and as such they should not held responsible or face any sort of 
stigmatizations (Pande, 2010).  
 A way in which this was done was by invoking the concept of surrogacy 
as a “necessity.” One surrogate, Salma, claimed the following: 
Who would choose to do this? I have had a lifetime worth of injections 
pumped into me. Some big ones in my hips hurt so much. In the beginning 
I had about twenty to twenty-five pills almost every day. I feel bloated all 
the time. But I know I have to do it for my children's future. This is not a 
choice; this is majboon [a necessity]. When we heard of surrogacy, we 
didn't have any clothes to wear after the rains- just one pair that used to get 
wet and our roof had fallen down. What were we to do? If your family is 
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starving what will you do with respect? Prestige won't fill an empty 
stomach (Pande, 2010, p. 301-302). 
 Thus, not only does the decision to become a surrogate become a necessity 
in order to keep the family afloat. Surrogates at the clinic in Anand also speak of 
providing for a better life for their children. Pande’s interview with surrogate 
Anjali was extremely demonstrative of this: 
I am doing this basically for my daughters; both will be old enough to be 
sent to school next year. I want them to be educated, maybe become 
teachers or air hostesses? I don't want them to grow up and be like me, 
illiterate and desperate. I don't think there is anything wrong with 
surrogacy. But of course people talk. They don't understand that we are 
doing this because we have a compulsion. People who get enough to eat 
interpret everything in the wrong way (Pande, 2010, p. 302). 
Greater than the womb. Scholarship on third world surrogates often 
emphasizes how the medical field makes surrogates feel as if they are 
“disposable” (Pande, 2010, p. 304) and as such are forced to question maternal 
roles. Akanksha’s surrogates are given intensive training regarding their role as 
surrogates where it is explained that their primary function is to serve as a vessel. 
It is reinforced that surrogates have no genetic ties to the child and as such will 
voluntarily give up the child right after birth. Pande’s (2010) interview with a 
infertility doctor at the clinic discussed the education of the surrogate, 
I had to educate them about everything because, you see, all these women 
are poor illiterate villagers. I told them, "You have to do nothing. It's not 
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your baby. You are just providing it a home in your womb for nine months 
because it doesn't have a house of its own. If some child comes to stay 
with you for just nine months what will you do? You will take care of it 
even more because it is someone else's. This is the same thing. You will 
take care of the baby for nine months and then give it to its mother. And 
for that you will be paid." I think finally how you train them, showing the 
positive experiences of both the parties ... is what makes surrogacy work 
(Pande, 2010, p. 308). 
However, the relationships Akanksha’s surrogates form with each other as 
well as with the commissioning mothers actually depicts the rejection of this 
notion. Surrogates actually understand themselves as fulfilling a unique and 
special role. Certain surrogates claim that they held certain traits that made them 
more desirable than other women, while others honed in the strong bond they 
formed with their commissioning couple. This narrative of “being special” not 
only helps surrogates fight off the stigmatizations surrounding stigma, it also 
makes them better surrogates—more willing to take care of their health, and 
subsequently, the health of the fetus (Pande, 2010). 
 
The surrogate’s relationship to the fetus. Research on the understanding 
of surrogacy as dirty work demonstrates that surrogates often have contradictory 
belief systems that help them deal with everyday stigmas. The effects of these 
beliefs are twofold—they allow for reduced emotional investment in the 
pregnancy as well as allow surrogates to situationally reject or embrace their 
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identity as laborers. These fractured belief systems transfer into fractured and 
often contradictory views of motherhood. Pande fines that “surrogates resort to 
contradictory narratives that simultaneously distance themselves from the babies 
and make claims upon them” (Pande, 2010, p. 307). Thus, though surrogates are 
constantly reminded that they have no genetic connection to the child they carry; 
making some sort of “claim” on the baby allows them to view themselves as more 
than just a womb for rent. 
In order for surrogates to justify their self worth and view themselves as 
more than a vessel, Indian surrogates often turn to particular narrative stories to 
deal with the complexities they are faced with. In the Akanksha clinic, a 
surrogate, Parvati, explained how surrogacy is not a new concept to Hindu 
women: “We can’t really call it [surrogacy] either work or social service. I 
personally feel it’s nothing strange to us Hindus; it’s in our religion. It’s 
something like what Yashoda ma did for Lord Krishna” (Pande, 2010, p. 308-
309). Another manner in which surrogates normalize their unique gestation 
process is by comparing it to the act of giving away daughters during marriage. 
Pande’s interview with the surrogate, Jyoti, revealed the following: 
Of course I'll feel sad while giving the baby up. But then I'll also have to 
give up my daughter once she gets married, won't I? She is paraya dhan 
[someone else's property] and so is this one. My daughter is my 
responsibility for eighteen years, then I have to give her up but I still 
remain responsible for anything that goes wrong. At least with this child I 
won't be responsible once I give her up. Also with this one I'll be happy 
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that she is somewhere where she will be happier. These people will send 
her to school, college, pamper her much more (Pande, 2010, p. 309).  
 
Kinship in the Akanksha Clinic. In the Akanksha Clinic, Amrita Pande 
(2009) studies the idea of everyday forms of kinship between the surrogates 
housed there. She defines these ties as the result of a “conscious every day 
strategy, and, at times, a vehicle for survival and/or resistance.” She explains how 
these constructions of kinship remove surrogates from their patrilineal duties and 
roles. These forms of kinship are borne in the sharing of bodily fluids—sweat, 
blood, and breast milk—, as well as the sharing of spaces, of the gestation period, 
and in the process of giving birth. These connections based on the sharing of 
bodily fluids are emphasized and heightened by surrogates.  When paired with a 
surrogate de-emphasizing genetic ties fetus has with its biological mother as well 
was the men who are involved in the commercial surrogacy process (the genetic 
father’s as well as the surrogate’s husbands), Pande finds that Indian surrogates 
actually fight against pre-existing hierarchies in the Indian social system, where 
typically genes and the male sexual product are placed on a higher level than any 
sort of social or female contribution.  
As surrogates are forming these bonds with each other, with the fetus, and 
with the intended, genetic mothers, they are simultaneously establishing ties 
across religious, class, and caste divisions by focusing on the notions of shared 
substances—blood and sweat—as more legitimate means for establishing kinship 
bonds.  
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Jyotsna Agnihotri Gupta argues against the radical feminist mindset in 
which third world surrogates are viewed as a “caste of breeders” whose role in 
society would be to carry the embryos of high-class white women. Gupta instead 
finds that the affect of assisted reproductive technologies is multifaceted—that 
“while some women use these technologies has meant a shift from being ‘objects’ 
and ‘victims’ to ‘knowing subjects’ and ‘agents’ of control over their own bodies, 
for other they have brought more outside control and expropriation” (Gupta, 
2006, p. 28). Thus, this type of surrogacy scholarship focuses on commercial 
surrogates as laborers rather than the victims of exploitations.  
 
The role of narratives. Surrogates implement narratives to help minimize 
the stigma attached to surrogacy. Narratives invoke the language of morality, 
allowing surrogates to recognize their self-worth and dignity. They also allow 
surrogates to justify their situation—letting them either emphasize their dire 
economic circumstance, by being pushed into the surrogacy to take care of their 
children, or by demonstrating a higher power make the decision for them. These 
narratives fight against the discourse of surrogates as “dirty workers,” equivalent 
to commercial sex workers. In one sense, narratives function as a form of 
resistance to negative discourses of surrogacy—from the media, from family, 
from the community, and from medical practitioners. Simultaneously, surrogacy 
plays into a narrative that fits in with the Indian construct of motherhood—in 
which motherhood is selfless, significant, and shared. 
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SHIFTS IN BIOETHICAL PRINCIPLES 
How then, do these narratives affect the bioethical principles of autonomy, 
beneficence, non-malfeasance and justice? In the Western sense, we autonomy 
emphasizes individual freedom and having the mental capacity to make decisions 
rationally. However, when it comes to the Anand surrogate, autonomy appears to 
be narrowed down to the achieving a reproductive freedom. Gestational surrogacy 
allows these women to experience pregnancy outside of an expectation and a duty 
and instead as a choice and a source of employment. Beneficence is defined as the 
duty to do good. Surrogates experience this by expressing the surrogacy 
experience as the gifting of life to an infertile woman or infertile couple. They 
experience non-malfeasance in a more familial sense in which they view 
partaking in the surrogacy as the only means to keep their family afloat and to 
give their children more options in life—something they view as a parental duty. 
Finally, the principle of justice is reduced to monetary means. Anand surrogates 
feel that justice is achieved by receive a paycheck equivalent to 10 to 12 years 
worth of salary for them.  
The position this project takes, then, is that, yes—the four tenets of 
bioethics are universally applicable. However, they should be flexible—
interpreted in response to cultural differences and thereby able to shift or alter in 
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Chapter 7 
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
CONCLUSION 
The role of culture in bioethics. Studies in bioethics have often taken a 
rather narrow approach to understanding the role of “culture” within the field. 
Definitions of culture have been constructed in such a way that it becomes 
essentialized or over-reduced; defined simply as a thin distinction and diversity, 
which are then used to make blanket claims about a “people.” However, the 
concept of culture is a rich one, steeped in epistemological complexities that hold 
the power to manipulate meanings of health and illness. 
Culture is too often perceived as a synonym for “ethnicity” as opposed to 
understood as a reference to cultural processes that shape and are shaped by 
institutions and behaviors. This distinction is important—it allows us to question 
our own cultural assumptions and to reflect on who we are, more specifically, 
who we are in relation to the institutions and people around us.  
So where does the idea of a universal template for bioethical principles 
stand in the midst of a strong urge for cultural relativism? It is important to 
recognize the significance of being able to understand and apply meta-ethical 
principles. But it is in the application process that there should be some flexibility. 
Marshall & Koenig (2004) find that “flexibility in the application of ethical rules 
is consistent with adherence to more fundamental ethical principles” (p. 260). 
Thus, when applying universal bioethical principles in a culturally relevant 
manner, we should take into consideration just how social and cultural values 
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intersect with commercial interests. Once these ideas have been layered upon each 
other, we can apply them to assisted reproductive technologies (ART)—
specifically commercial gestational surrogacy. We can explore under what 
(assuming that there are) cultural conditions that ART can promote a woman’s 
agency in the process of reproduction. It requires attention to power structures as 
well as understanding the position of women in society and how they relate to 
each other and to other actors within a culture.  
The position this project takes, then, is that, yes—the four tenets of 
bioethics are universally applicable. However, they should be flexible—
interpreted in response to cultural differences and thereby be able to shift or alter 
in their application. These alterations in application are defined and shaped by the 
narratives used by various groups. In this case, they have different meanings to 
medical practitioners, to surrogates, and to advocacy and/or opposing factions.  
 
The role of narratives in bioethics. Humans look to stories for guidance, 
as a sort of moral compass. Whether these stories come in the form of written 
narratives or spoken word, the moral principles woven within the words exist as a 
stepping-stone for individuals to make their own moral decisions. With stories 
being such an integral part of the human existence, it is inherent that stories come 
into play in all aspects of life—including in sickness and in health. Thus, the 
concept of narrative ethics has naturally found its way into the medical field—
individuals bringing forth their own personal histories as well as the stories that 
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guide their moral choices into the decision-making process. It is interesting to 
compare these stories from a secular and religious viewpoint.  
Secular bioethics often places great emphasis on the importance of case 
studies while religious individuals look toward forms of scripture for guidance. 
These two variations of a narrative are typically viewed as distinct and separate 
forms of guidance—each playing a different role within the context of bioethics. 
However, when looked at in the framework of narrative ethics, both case studies 
and religious narratives play a similar part in medical decision making—existing 
as textual examples of a complex problem and as the moral conclusion or decision 
that came from them.  
Narratives serve as a means to establish truth and authenticity regarding 
the moral issues surrounding mutable case studies in medicine. The use of 
narrative ethics in the medical field claims that fictional stories allow individuals 
to confront the severity and confusion of complex clinical situations by allowing 
for the application of moral claims in action. This provides individuals the 
capacity to relate to a situation that, without a fictional narrative, would appear 
outside of their circumstances. 
Thus, case stories, such as those told by the surrogates at the Akanksha 
Infertility Clinic, have great power. With this power comes a social responsibility. 
In this context, literary narratives have the power to help shape decisions made in 
bioethics and subsequently comes with and required examination of “the 
reciprocal responsibilities incurred by the writer who encodes thoughts and 
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feelings into language by the reader who rescues words from their secrets” 
(Charon, 2002, p. 22).  
Narratives represent a worldview, a framework of knowledge, and a set of 
principles interacting with each other within the context of a story, scene, or 
situation. The end result of a narrative makes an authoritative decision regarding a 
problem that presented itself within the story. So only by paying attention to how 
a narrative affects an individual do “we see more clearly where we are in the 
story, and this ultimately shows us something like the way out of the case, the 
denouement, the back door to the outside world” (Charon, 2002, p. 25). I have 
specifically been focusing on narratives on an individual level—from the 
perspective of the surrogates in the Akanksha Infertility Clinic. However, another 
narrative, unique to India and to the Anand surrogates, is the Hindu narrative of 
new technologies.  
 
The adaptive Hindu worldview. In India, these narratives are first and 
most obviously evident in how the media explains new technologies—nuclear 
bombs, for example are constructed as “Brahmastra”—a weapon of Brahma. With 
technologies such as IVF and surrogacy, India is turning to the first chapter of the 
Mahabharata in which it is claimed that members of the royal Kauvara family 
were born from stem cells. The media also projects the Hindu trinity as demigods 
of fertility (Bhardawaj, 2006). Fertility doctors not only play the parts of Brahma 
and Vishnu, creating and sustaining life, respectively, but also play the part of 
destroying life—the role of Shiva. Additionally, there is the story of Krishna’s 
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birth—his embryonic form removed from the womb of his genetic mother and 
into the womb of a surrogate mother. 
Occurrences like these are not conscious attempts to revert back to a 
cultural, historical and religious origin, but simply exist as a natural tendency to 
explain a new event, technology, or cultural system within the Indian context. It is 
also not unique to India. Worldwide, people convey ideas via stories and 
narratives unique to their own cultural background. This layering of traditional 
“self” on top of a modern ‘other” is referred to as a double entrenchment of 
tradition. It is a belief that tradition is first rooted in institutions such as the caste 
system or religious institutions and then again in “modern institutions” such as 
bureaucracy and law (Bhardwaj, 2006).  
As such, in India, the traditional and modern are continually redefined. 
Modern institutions are continually placed in a cultural context in which they are 
given meaning and sense based on the virtue of the geographic location within 
which they exist. A prime example of this is the presence of biomedicine in India, 
used as a means to circumvent the issue of infertility. Biomedicine, then, is 
colored by Hindu traditions in India (Bhardawaj, 2006).  
Metaphysical explanations have become increasingly acceptable with the 
uncertain nature of assisted reproduction. These cultural methods of making sense 
of modern technologies indigenizes biomedical practices and also demonstrates 
how biomedical modalities work with Hinduism’s pluralistic tendencies. It is was 
allows a number Indian citizen to go beyond generalizing technical and clinical 
application of science in the European and American frameworks, and personalize 
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it to their own culture. As such, biomedicine set again the Indian backdrop so 
quickly assimilated into a cultural framework that is transforming the way that it 
is perceived as well as practiced.  
 
It is understood then, that this project finds the use of narratives a 
successful means to understand how bioethical principles shift in their application 
when applied in different cultural context. So how should this phenomenon be 
considered in the generation of policy and regulations regarding commercial 
gestational surrogacy?  
The flexibility in the application of universal ethical principles is 
something that I find can be extended into a policy realm. I believe this can be 
done by (1) setting a global standard that fertility clinics all over the world must 
exemplify (2) by establishing local programs that bring to light the experiences of 
marginalized women; pushing to understand their motivations for becoming a 
surrogate, and (3) coordination between national and international structures to 
ensure that surrogacy regulations are being enforced and the women involved are 
receiving appropriate compensation.  
The flexibility illustrated by the application bioethical principles exists in 
the utilization of narratives, this time through the medium of local groups that 
specifically seek to understand and protect the position of surrogates, to account 
for a sense of cultural competency in a medical setting.  
It is important, then, to recognize that the overall goal of generating policy 
for transnational surrogacy is to reduce injustices that have been brought to the 
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forefront by both narratives of surrogates as well as by legal precedents set by 
cases such as the baby Manji case and Balaz v. India. Thus we need to consider 
policy from both a human rights and structural/institutional perspective. This 
invokes a dual-lens ethics.  
 
Dual lens bioethics. This particular form of bioethics extends beyond 
simply identifying ART challenges in developing countries and asks to look 
further into issues of the negative consequences of globalization. Dual-lens 
bioethics brings three main points to the forefront, 
first, as a “terrain of continuing political struggle,” human rights principles 
are a means for reasserting the priority of investments in  health over 
freedom of the market; second, advocating for social and economic rights 
(rights of development) for the disenfranchised (e.g., in the context of 
local and global disparities in access to primary care) explicitly recognizes 
that all debates over medicine, science, and technology take place on 
unlevel playing fields involving haves and have-nots; finally, promoting 
women’s rights as human rights grounds activism in a strategic 
commitment to the least well-off in every area of the world (Ryan, 2006, 
p. 822).  
The clinical field of fertility is rooted within the subcontinent’s cultural 
topography with the transfer of “Western” assisted reproductive technologies not 
simplified to the basic exchange of clinicians offering treatment and patients 
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receiving treatment but rather, encompasses how doctors and consumers 
assimilate “the technoscience of conception” (Bharadwaj, 2006, p. 452).  
Bharadwaj (2006) argues that either the success or failure of assisted 
reproductive technologies in India will become a critique of the Western 
“science” of fertility/conception, especially when embedded within the context of 
the Hindu faith.  He finds that when assisted reproduction is paired with the 
Hindu faith, specifically, it appears to merge the otherwise seemingly separate 
entities of the traditional and the modern, “the sacred and profane, the human and 
the superhuman, science and religion” (Bharadwaj, 2006, p. 455).  
Bhardawaj discusses an enchanted understanding of a disenchanted 
worldview of biomedicine and that this enchantment is a part of a cultural 
indigenization process of biomedicine. This is very apparent in the speed of 
growth and assimilation of assisted reproductive technology in India. 
Technologies such as in vitro fertilization (IVF) do not necessarily easily surpass 
“cultural voids” and local views—cultural, social, economic, or political—shape 
how technologies from the West are promoted and received by non-Western 
individuals. In the context of assisted reproductive technologies in India, this is 
expressed as a battle between the traditional and the modern. Western traditions 
are often understood as the normative tradition with essentialist imaginations of 
India’s traditions simply standing at the confluence.  
Scholars of the Hindu tradition explain that those invested in the Hindu 
worldview has a unique ability to relate back to its cultural past allowing modern 
word views to emerge as embedded in the traditional worldview. Milton Singer 
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finds that “this traditionalism of Indian civilization lies elsewhere—in its capacity 
to incorporate innovations into an expanding and changing structure of culture 
and society. This capacity is reflected in a series of adaptive mechanisms and 
processes for dealing with the novel, the foreign, the strange” (Bharadwaj, 2005).  
 
A human rights discourse. When it comes to establishing policy 
regarding Assisted Reproductive Technologies, it is important to ask whether the 
exchange between consumers and sellers of reproductive technologies can 
mutually benefit the women involved. One sect of bioethicists and feminists 
firmly believe, yes, that if proper informed consent is obtained, particularly on the 
surrogate or egg donors end, exploitation can be avoided (Ryan, 2006).  However, 
many believe that this answer is naïve—missing completely the understanding of 
larger networks of power that hold control over the value of goods as well as 
access to them.  Gupta finds that the establishment of a market relationship 
between infertile women desperately seeking surrogates and/or egg donors and 
fertile women selling these services and reproductive “products” is more than just 
a thin relationship between producers and consumers and needs to be better 
understood as women caught in a “capitalist global economy that needs women 
and yet marginalizes women’s labor both as producers and reproducers in search 
profit” (Gupta, 2006, p.35).  
A human rights model is also used as means to critique power imbalances 
in the globalization of medicine and assisted reproductive technologies.  Virginia 
Sharpe finds this approach to be “more extensive than utility maximization, more 
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democratic than paternalism, more mutual than informed consent and more 
responsive to social inequities than are consumer preference satisfaction and 
caveat emptor” (Sharpe, 2004, p. 454).  However, human rights paradigms can 
also serve to elevate the over all health by presenting it as a public good, calling 
to the forefront issues of power hierarchies and the distribution of health care 
services on a local, national, and global level. Ryan (2006) finds that “for all its 
limitations, the language of human rights is one of the most powerful vehicles for 
translating awareness of social injustices into political and strategic claims” (p. 
821). 
 
The discourse of development. Power structures and dynamics are also 
called to attention in the context of a development discourse. When looking at 
development relations, the role of financial movements, trade patterns, and 
economic growth are made explicit in the establishment of a woman’s 
reproductive agency (Ryan, 2006). This is evident into the transaction over 
wombs in transnational commercial gestational surrogacy making apparent the 
gap between the powerful elite and impoverished women. Thus to fully 
understand the integration of assisted reproductive technologies within a 
developing country must look beyond ART as a simple solution for the problem 
of infertility an instead focuses on the potential impact of these technologies on a 
woman’s health and cultural status. To do this, attention is paid to the conditions 
under which a woman makes decisions regarding her health, her sexuality, and 
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her reproductive agency. The development perspective then identifies structural 
injustices by bring light to problems in polices, programs and practices.  
 
 The Indian subcontinent is in a unique position where it has a government 
that fully supports reproductive tourism—specifically the enormous amount of 
tourist money it brings into a still developing country. At the same time, the 
country deals with the backlash of belief that they are allowing for the 
exploitation of impoverished women as well as clear examples—the cases of 
Baby Manji and the Balaz twins—that they’re legal system is not equipped to 
handle issues of transnational surrogacy in an effect manner. One potential way to 
regulate transnational surrogacy could be by invoking Marion Young’s social 
connection model.  
 
 Marion Young: social connection model. Young finds that “social 
structures are not limited to formal institutional rules of cooperation but also 
include interdependent processes of competition and cooperation that link social 
positions with relations among individuals” (Donchin, 2010, p. 323) Young 
believes that by breaking a social system down and understanding all of the 
agents that exist within it have a shared social responsibility to understand and fix 
any structural injustices. She recognizes that different individuals or groups 
experience different degrees of power and influence within a system—those with 
the most power seek to experience the most benefit. However, when injustices 
manifest, they also bear a larger share of responsibility for any unjust outcomes.  
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 Anne Donchin finds that when it comes to assisted reproductive services, 
the social connection model of responsibility is not being implemented. Instead, 
there is fractured relationship between globalized economic structures and social 
structures. This allows for women in developing countries to be commodified and 
exploited tomake up for the infertility of Western women. Thus, immediately 
apparent as a structural injustice is the “asymmetrical constructions of social roles 
of women and men and reinforce[d] stereotypes about women as primarily sexual 
beings” (Donchin, 2010, p. 324). 
 Thus, there is the need to look at things on both the individual level—
narratives—as well as a need to shift from “isolated acts of consent to evaluation 
of the full context surrounding such acts” (Donchin, 2010, p. 325). 
 Thus, though narratives of surrogates imply that impoverished rural Indian 
women find it a just behavior to sell bodily services if it keeps them from 
experiencing more poverty, it does not change an morally unfair offer into a fair 
one. There is exists the exploitation of the situation and vulnerability of 
impoverished women.  So then, in order to generate policy and regulations 
regarding commercial gestational surrogacy, surrogacy must be understood in 
both nonmonetary as well as monetary terms. 
 One way we could do this effectively on a transnational level could be to 
“harmonize regulation among jurisdictions in a manner that maximizes the long-
term interests of all affected parties” (Donchin, 2010, p. 331). To do this, Donchin 
suggests setting up a means to internationally certify fertility clinics using a global 
set of “standard” criteria. There also needs to be a way to address both internal 
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and external factors that exist in the reproductive tourism trade. Specifically, with 
the Indian government, there needs to be a pressure to actually enforce and 
respect regulations of assisted reproductive technologies. Additionally there 
should be a “framework for ethical norms and regulations and situate debate on 
ARTs within the context of women’s health, human rights, and social justice” 
(Donchin, 2010, p. 332). 
By paying special attention to the interplay between issues of gender 
inequalities, of poverty, and by considering cultural and religious traditions as 
factors that generate threats to reproductive health while simultaneously pushing 
for the coordinated efforts of national governments and international structures to 
enforce regulation of surrogacy, I find that we can develop a successful beginning 
point to develop policy of transnational reproductive tourism, particularly the 
service of gestational surrogacy.  
 
DISCUSSION & FURTHER RESEARCH CONSIDERATIONS 
The literature regarding surrogacy is rich with narratives seeking to 
understand the complexities that manifest during and after the gestational process. 
This occurrence is most clear in the study of the surrogates in the Akanksha 
Infertility Clinic.  Amrita Pande’s 2009 ethnographic studies of an infertility 
clinic in Anand India study the cultural understandings of surrogacy from the 
surrogates’ points of view. She looks at the narratives they invoke to cope with 
the stigmas associated with the institution of surrogacy and the narratives 
surrogates use to simultaneously separate themselves from and hold some sort of 
	    71 
claim to the child they are carrying. Pande also looks at the narratives of the 
kinship that forms between the surrogates in the clinic and how these bonds help 
women view surrogacy as a form of reproductive freedom.   
Narratives are also evident on a national level. I explore this by focusing 
on the prevailing religion in India—Hinduism—and its surprising adaptability to 
modern developments. The adaptability provided by Hinduism’s flexible nature 
allow the nation an alternative way to understand the complexity of new 
technologies—by understanding them through traditional Hindu lore. Specific to 
fertility technologies, Hinduism explains stem cells by utilizing the story of the 
birth of the Kauvara family in the Mahabharata. Additionally, the birth of 
Krishna, who during gestation is transferred from the womb of his biological 
mother to the womb of his social mother, details a story of surrogacy.  This 
purports the belief that tradition can first be rooted in religious institutions and 
then again in “modern institutions” such as bureaucracy and law (Bhardwaj, 
2006).  
Case law, then, also functions as its own kind of narrative. Case law exists 
to deal with conflict that occurs in human affairs. Cases are often set up as a sort 
of story that engages readers in a legal text. The statement of facts that are 
provided in case briefs have a story quality to them—complete with characters 
and drama that exist within a specific chronology. Furthermore, case law is a 
continuously building narrative. Outcomes and legal precedents are all based on 
pre-existing decisions and as such are deeply entrenched in a historical narrative.  
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What’s unique about my study is that it seeks to incorporate all of these 
types of narratives in an attempt to understand how they relate to and build upon 
one another. During the course of this project—particularly the research portion—
I found disconnect between how narratives are employed in ethics and 
subsequently how narratives and ethics come together to form policy. While the 
articles and studies I read focused on narratives told from one particular vantage 
point, they often failed to explain the significant of intersecting narratives.  
I believe my own project starts to scratch the surface of understanding 
how narratives from different perspectives interact with one another. I first look at 
how gestational surrogacy fragments Western views of motherhood—separating 
out types of motherhood from one another; genetic, gestational, social, and 
adoptive. From there, I seek out different forms of narrative in order to understand 
definitions of motherhood—my ultimate goal being to attempt to understand how 
constructions of motherhood play a role in generating regulations of transnational 
gestational surrogacy.  
Thus, cases such as Johnson v. Calvert, Moschetta v. Moschetta, and 
McDonald v. McDonald provide case law narratives for definitions of 
motherhood. I also looked at motherhood from the vantage point of the Indian 
surrogate—seeking to understand the definition of “Indian Motherhood” and 
whether surrogates feel they exemplify this definition. Finally, I look at how the 
Indian population utilizes traditional Hindu folklore to explain complex new 
technologies, specifically assisted reproductive technologies. As such, I begin to 
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look at the interplay between the local, national, and global through the medium 
of narratives.  
 However, there is still much to be explored in this type of project. I spend 
the bulk of my project understanding the narratives that occur from an individual 
level—from the perspective of Indian surrogates at the Akanksha Infertility 
Clinic. I use this as a starting point—making observations and judgments about 
how gestational surrogacy should be regulated based off how these individual 
narratives intersect with narratives that occur on a local and legal level.  
However, studying a topic such as transnational gestational surrogacy, I 
need to better understand narratives that take place on a global level—that is to 
better understand how national structure and institutions are both shaped and 
shaped by global forces. I only briefly look into these issues—specifically in the 
Indian court cases of Baby Manji and Balaz v. India, both of which highlight how 
transnational surrogacy brings to light a slew of new ethical issues ranging from 
new practices of adoption to questions of the citizenship of a child born from 
surrogacy.  
 However, a thread of commonality that exists within the narratives at all 
levels is a desire to protect the best interests of the children born from surrogacy. 
This could be a good starting point to explore more in depth the interactions that 
are occurring between individuals and their communities, communities and their 
states, states and their nations, as well as between nations themselves. By using 
one common theme to link the various narratives that different structural levels 
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they exist in, I could better understand how narratives intersect or build upon each 
other.  
Additionally, the individual narratives that I explore in this project only 
focus on the vantage point of the Indian surrogates. It is also important to 
understand why Western women are so desperately seeking out reproductive 
services—to understand the cultural context that they exist in. The end goal of the 
regulation of assisted reproductive technologies to reduce injustices and protect 
the rights of all parties involved—the surrogates as well as the infertile women 
and couples.  
Thus to more effectively provide policy suggestions regarding commercial 
gestational surrogacy, there must be a more holistic picture provided. The 
complexities of transnational gestational surrogacy must be approached and 
understood on the many levels from which surrogacy is experienced—from the 
perspective of global structures (market forces, human rights, economic 
development), to national structures (hospitals, fertility clinics, legislatures), to 
the nuanced and personal experiences of individuals themselves.   
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